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Abstract
Hydrogen fuel cells have the potential to dramatically reduce emissions from
the energy sector, particularly when integrated into an automotive applica-
tion. However there are three main hurdles to the commercialisation of this
promising technology; one of which is reliability. Current standards require
an automotive fuel cell to last around 5000 hours of operation (equivalent to
around 150,000 miles), which has proven difficult to achieve to date. This
hurdle can be overcome through in-depth reliability analysis including tech-
niques such as Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) amongst others. Research has found that the reliability field
regarding hydrogen fuel cells is still in its infancy, and needs development, if
the current standards are to be achieved. In this work, a detailed reliability
study of a Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC) is undertaken.
The results of which are a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a PEMFC.
The FMEA and FTA are the most up to date assessments of failure in fuel
cells made using a comprehensive literature review and expert opinion.
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1. Introduction
With the increase in environmental awareness and climate change con-
cerns in recent years, hydrogen fuel cells have been put forward as a tech-
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nology that could potentially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Anthro-
pogenic activities contribute to climate change mainly through Greenhouse
Gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuel based energy sources. These harm-
ful GHGs are comprised of, among others, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) that contribute to the greenhouse effect. Ad-
ditionally, energy prices are set to continue to rise by alarming rates[1] which
will disrupt the energy system of many countries due to a rise in oil prices.
Therefore an alternative energy source would mitigate energy security and
pricing concerns to a certain degree.
The United Kingdom (UK) emitted 549.3 Million tones of Carbon Dioxide
equivelant (MtCO2e) in 2011[2] and 122.2 MtCO2e was due to the transport
industry, with 74% of this figure due to cars, taxis and buses[3]. Due to the
aforementioned negative environmental impacts of emissions from fossil fuel
energy sources, this figure needs to be dramatically reduced not only to meet
government targets, but for the health of the biosphere. The UK government
set out targets to reduce GHG emissions in the ‘Climate Change Act’ of 2008.
The act presents the targets of an 80% reduction of greenhouse gas levels by
2050, with a closer target of a 34% reduction by 2020. These two targets are
based upon the level of GHG emissions in 1990[4]. The targets are legally
bound and therefore must be met, thus many initiatives and research has
emerged to aid the UK in reaching these targets. Other countries have also
pledged to tackle climate change, with the US president stating that the US
will reduce CO2 emissions 17% from 2005 levels by 2020, 42% by 2030 and
finally 83% by 2050.
Hydrogen fuel cells have the potential to mitigate the aforementioned
climate change concerns, as they are a zero-emission energy conversion device.
They use H2 and O2 to form water, releasing heat and electrical energy. Their
only emissions are water, meaning that at the point of use, the fuel cell has no
carbon emissions associated with it. If the H2 fuel is sourced from renewable
means, the whole process is zero emissions and therefore has the potential to
dramatically cut CO2 emissions in a number of industries.
Fuel cells currently suffer from reliability concerns, and are more likely to
contribute to the above issues if the current reliability issues are overcome.
Hence, this paper analyses the reliability of a PEMFC using in-depth
techniques in order to understand how their performance can be improved.
The layout of the paper is as follows:
In section 2, the reasons for studying PEMFCs is given, followed by a brief
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description of the techniques used in reliability analysis. Section 3 describes
the reliability techniques adopted here and previous related studies on the re-
liability of PEMFCs. Section 4 describes the FMEA performed and the main
conclusions drawn from it. Section 5 outlines the Fault Tree (FT) developed
and section 6 concludes the findings of the study.
2. Reliability Analysis
The US Department of Energy (DoE), Japanese New Energy and Indus-
trial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO) and European Hydrogen
and Fuel Cell Technology Platform (HFP) Implementation Panel (IP) have
all set reliability targets for PEMFCs in automotive application of a lifetime
of more than 5000 hours of operation (equivalent to around 150,000 miles
operation)[5]. The current state of fuel cell development struggles to meet
these targets, and as such, an in-depth reliability analysis of PEMFCs is
invaluable to help manufacturers and developers. Such an analysis requires
obtaining a detailed understanding of the failure modes of all the different
parts of the cell, and the effects the failures have on the cell as a whole.
Currently, the understanding of the reliability of PEMFCs is still in its
infancy, and requires further development to help with the commercialisation
of this promising technology.
The work presented in this paper uses the techniques of FMEA and FTA
to comprehensively ascertain key failure phenomena and analyse their role
and effects within in an automotive PEMFC system. Boundaries are set to
only consider the PEMFC itself, the balance of plant and supporting ancil-
laries are omitted as shown in Figure 1, where the functional block diagram
of a simple fuel cell automotive system is shown. The dotted rectangle shows
the boundaries of the system considered here.
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Figure 1: Boundaries of presented reliability analysis
2.1. PEM FMEA
FMEA is a bottom-up approach to analysing equipment, or a system, with
relation to its failure events. That is to say that the analysis of the system
starts with the individual components that make up the system, rather than
looking at the overall system and working top-down. The technique is a
systematic scrutiny of all of the individual ways in which a component or piece
of equipment can fail, and the effect of that failure on the overall system’s
operation. Any additional features can be added to a basic FMEA such as
mitigation strategies and poignant remarks for the reader. It is ideally used
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early on in the development cycle in order to ascertain key failure modes that
can be designed out as early as possible. It should not, however, be limited
to the design stage of system development, but should be used throughout
the development stages as an ongoing process.
FMEA techniques were first used by the US military, and the standard
MIL-STD-1629A [6] was developed to help standardise the FMEA process.
The process of performing an FMEA includes: [7]
• Breaking down the equipment/system into components or sub-assembly
blocks.
• Examining each component or block for its modes of failure.
• Listing each mode of failure according to the effect it has locally and
on the system.
• Applying failure rates for each failure mode where quantification is
required.
2.2. Advantages of FMEA
FMEA is a comprehensive way to analyse all of the potential component
failure modes in a system. It is widely used in industry as a means to identify,
rank and mitigate against the component failure modes.
2.3. Disadvantages of FMEA
The main drawback when using only FMEA for reliability analysis, is
that the technique is geared towards analysing individual component failure
mode occurrences. Because these failure modes are considered one by one, the
interaction of multiple failure mode occurrences are often not listed using this
method. Additionally, this type of reliability process is not fully quantitative.
Severity and risk rankings can be made, however overall reliability levels
cannot be deduced using FMEA.
2.4. PEM FTA
FTA is a deductive technique that can be used to classify the instrumental
relationships leading to a specific failure mode. Whereas FMEA is a bottom-
up approach, FTA is a top-down approach and is a graphical representation
of the relationships between the failure modes previously identified in the
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FMEA. In order to describe this approach, Figure 2 shows an example
branch of a FT from a larger FT for a fuel cell system.
Figure 2: Example branch of a Fault Tree
‘Pinholes’ is the top event of the branch of the FT and indicates the overall
undesirable event that the FT is modelling. This top event is split by an ‘OR’
gate into the intermediate event: ‘Pinholes due to Mechanical Stress’ and the
basic event ‘Exothermal combustion due to previously formed pinholes’. The
‘OR’ gate means that either of the two intermediate events could trigger the
top event. The intermediate event is then broken down further. ‘Pinholes
due to Mechanical Stress’ is fed by another ‘OR’ gate. ‘Pinholes due to
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mechanical stress’ is fed by an intermediate event ‘Swelling & Foreign Particle
Presence’ and the basic event ‘Creep’. ‘Swelling & Foreign Particle Presence’
is fed by an‘AND’ gate that is in-turn fed by an intermediate event (‘Local
mechanical stress due to increased pressure’) and a transfer gate (‘Foreign
Particle Presence’). A transfer gate takes logic from another part of the
overall FT and transfers this logic in without repeating large section of the
graph. ‘Foreign Particle Presence’ itself is fed by an ‘OR’ gate resulting from
the combinational occurrence of ‘Oxide Film Formation’, ‘Platinum Particle
Presence’ transfered from another section of the overall tree, ‘Dissolution of
Metal Ions’ and ‘Contamination from Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity’.
The values for ’eta’ (η) listed underneath the basic events is the scale
parameter for the quantification analysis using Weibull analysis which is
discussed in section 4.2. The values for ‘Q’ are the unrealiability of the basic
event, expressed as anmumber between zero and one. If Q = 0, the basic
event is 100& live, and if Q = 1, the basic event is considered to be 0% live.
Basic events, such as ‘Creep’ in the above example, are events which
cannot be broken down any further and for which basic information, such
as failure rate, repair rate etc. is available. All intermediate events can be
broken down further until reaching the basic events.
Once a full FT has been created, the Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) can be
obtained from the tree, where a MCS is a minimal combination of basic
events that cause the top event. These can then be used to determine the
probability or frequency of the top event[7].
2.4.1. Advantages of FTA
Due to being a graphical representation, FTA is structured in such a way
that is easy for the reader to comprehend. The interactions between failure
modes can be easily determined from the simple representation style. FTA
can also be quantitatively analysed to ascertain overall system reliability.
2.4.2. Disadvantages of FTA
The main drawbacks of using FTA is that it cannot take into account
dependencies between failure modes. They also don’t tend to consider the
cause of failure modes, rather just tackling the knock-on effect of the failure’s
occurrence. Also, a FT must be undertaken individually for each failure
mode of interest. The entire range of operating conditions that the system
can operate in are not considered in one tree. A tree must be made for each
operating condition to be fully accurate.
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2.5. Existing Reliability Analysis of PEMFC Systems
2.5.1. Fuel Cell Reliability
The application of reliability techniques to PEMFC systems in the liter-
ature is limited. Rama, et al. [8] adapted an FMEA approach and presented
a tabular format list of failure modes in a PEMFC which was limited to only
the area of the failure mode, and a brief description of the failure mode itself.
It did not describe the effect of the failure mode on the system. It is a good
start to ascertaining the different failure modes attributable to a PEMFC,
however it can be further developed to provide additional information and
comprehension of failure relationships in a PEMFC.
Other work in the area includes that of Placca & Kouta [9], who present
an initial FTA of a PEMFC in no specific application. The work considered
failure modes and their effects for a total of 37 individual basic events in a
single cell PEMFC. Component failure modes including; ‘Creep’, ‘Fatigue
from relative humidity and temperature cycling’ and ‘Oxide film formation’
were considered. The overall FTA top event of ‘Degradation of the cell’
was split into three of the four physical components of the cell; membrane,
Catalyst Layer (CL) and Gas Diffusion Layer (GDL). The Bipolar Plate
(BIP) was omitted for undisclosed reasons.
FTs have been used in other works regarding water management in PEMFCs
[10], however this work was not targeted at PEMFC degradation, and rather
singled out the contributing factors towards water management concerns.
FTA was used by [11] to explain failures in a solid oxide fuel cell. It
used fuzzy logic terms for the basic events for failures, such as: ‘Decrease in
stack power’ and ‘Increase in stack power’. The authors discuss how FTA
is used to ”clear out” complex relationships between failure modes, however
one of the main stumbling blocks of FTA is that it cannot take into account
dependencies and intricate relationships.
Other reliability techniques such as Markov Modelling (MM)[12] and
Petri-Net simulation[13] have been used to study fuel cell systems. In the
study by [12] the reliability of PEMFCs in power plant environments was con-
sidered. The authors used the common fuel cell Nernst equation to model
fuel cell performance, then used a simple Markov Model to plot reliability
using a Weibull distribution for degradation rates, based upon an assumed
overall lifetime of 5000 hours. Using MM for fuel cell reliability would require
very large models that could show degradation in stages for each component.
Petri-Net simulation has been used by [13] to model the reliability of
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PEMFCs using a relatively simple Petri-Net as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Petri-Net Model of fuel cell/stack/fleet of cars
The work uses the Petri-Net in Figure 3 to calculate a simulated relia-
bility of a single cell, stack or even fleet of fuel cell cars. It uses a set of
parameters for six of the conditions that a fuel cell can operate in, and an
associated degradation rate when in those operating conditions. The degra-
dation rates are taken from literature and applied throughout the running of
the model. The authors acknowledge that the model is simplified as regards
steady state degradation instead of changing rates determined by stack age
or operational conditions.
2.5.2. Fuel Cell Degradation, Prognosis & Simulation
Although the area of fuel cell reliability modelling is not well covered in
the literature, fuel cell degradation studies are prominent. Countless compo-
nent level experimentation and analyses are presented in the literature body,
with [5], [14] and [15] proving to be very good review papers discussing the
range of failure modes analysed in the literature.
The vast majority of works in the literature related to degradation are
individual component experiments, or studies of the operating condition’s
affect on PEMFC performance. An example of which is presented by [16],
and looks at the lifetime prediction of a PEMFC under ‘accelerated startup-
shutdown’ cycling.
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Some prognosis work using neural network modeling to determine flooding
and drying out of membranes is presented by [17]. This work uses FTA
techniques to qualitatively understand what happens when a membrane drys
or floods, then uses said information to inform the neural network model to
simulate flooding and drying out.
Additional work by [18] used polarisation curve and Electrochemical Impedance
Spectroscopy (EIS) techniques to characterise real world fuel cell degradation,
then predicting ageing time in the future through analysis of key features in
the polarisation and EIS data sets..
As the work described in this paper uses FMEA and develops a FT for
a PEMFC, the previous studies of [8] & [9] are directly relevant and hence
have been described in more detail below.
2.5.3. Rama, et al. [8] ‘Failure mode identification’
The previous work in [8] identified 22 failure modes attributable to re-
duction in performance or catastrophic cell failure. Overall degradation was
divided into the electrochemical overpotential pathways; activation, mass
transport, ohmic and fuel efficiency losses, with catastrophic cell failure also
noted as a division of overall degradation. A list of faults is presented that
shows a cause, however no system effect for each failure mode is given. The
comprehensive list of failure modes relating to the loss mechanisms includes
all types of PEMFC construction at the time of writing, some of which are
no longer used.
2.5.4. Placca & Kouta [9] FTA
FTA was recently presented by Placca & Kouta [9] in an attempt to
model the reliability of a single cell PEMFC. From various literary sources,
they came to the conclusion that there are 37 individual basic events to
be considered when analysing the degradation of a PEMFC. The FT pre-
sented is a physical analysis of a single cell PEMFC, splitting the top-event
of the ‘Degradation of the Cell’ down through an OR gate into three physical
components of a PEMFC; Membrane (G2), Gas Diffusion Layer (G4) and
Catalyst Layer (G3) as shown in Figure 4. These are three of the four main
physical components of a PEMFC with only the bipolar plate being omitted.
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Figure 4: ’Global’ Fault Tree presented in [9]
G2, G3 and G4 each had 12, 12 and 6 intermediate events respectively,
which further branched down through OR gates to the basic events. As all
of the gates in the presented FT were of the OR variety, the minimum cut
sets are simply single events, representing the basic events of the tree.
2.6. Contribution of this Research
The qualitative failure identification table presented by Rama, et al. [8]
has proved to be a good start in identifying the multitude of failure modes
in a PEMFC system.
The aforementioned presented quantitative FTA by Placca & Kouta [9]
has proven to be a good first step in degradation analysis and failure fore-
casting. Some areas that need to be addressed have been identified in [19] &
[20], in particular critical component omission, basic event logic & structure,
ambiguity of events and lack of standardised data sets. It is envisaged that
if these issues can be addressed, the overall degradation analysis of PEMFCs
will become increasingly more accurate.
The research contained within this paper contributes to the reliability
area by providing the first, fully comprehensive FMEA which details the
most up-to-date failure modes in a tabular format. The FTA contains the
most current and advanced logic of failure in a PEMFC.
3. Proposed FMEA
3.1. PEMFC Construction
Due to the range of materials and components that can be used to create a
PEMFC, the following analysis is based upon the key assumptions of material
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and construction (Figure 5);
• Standard PEMFC construction
– Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) based membrane
– Carbon GDL
– Pt/C catalyst layer
– Stainless-Steel BIP
• Using H2 fuel feed with a purity of 99.97% as required by the ISO
standard 14687-2:2012 [21]
In the FMEA & FT the PEMFC has been considered to be composed of
the following components: membrane, GDL, catalyst and BIP as described
in the following sections.
Figure 5: Components of a PEMFC [22]
3.1.1. PTFE Membrane
PTFE membranes are perfluorinated polymers, with the most commonly
available being Nafion. Perfluorinated polymer membranes are also available
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from Tokuyama (Neosepta-F®), W. L. Gore and Associates, Inc. (Gore-
Select®), Asahi Glass Company (Flemion®), Asahi Chemical Industry
(Asiplex®) and Dow. Nafion has a backbone chemical structure very similar
to PTFE (Teflon®) however, where it differs is that Nafion includes sulfonic
acid (SO3−H+) functional groups. The PTFE backbone forms the strength
of the membrane, and the SO3−H+ terminal groups provide charge sites for
protonic transport.
3.1.2. Carbon GDL
The GDL is made from a carbon-fibre based material that is either formed
into a paper or woven cloth type. Carbon-fibre is used due to its high elec-
trical conductivity and high porosity values. Due to the materials for each
method of constructing the GDL being identical, the failure mechanisms that
can be experienced by either construction method are the same, therefore in
any reliability analysis of the PEMFC it is not necessary to consider the
construction methods separately.
3.1.3. Pt/C Catalyst
Pt and C are mixed in an ionomer and usually ball milled to mix into an
ink. This is then either screen printed or directly painted onto the membrane
or GDL surfaces.
3.1.4. Stainless-Steel BIP
The endplates, or BIPs are usually made from steel, and are routed to
form serpentine channels for the gas to be delivered to the GDL component.
3.2. Operating Conditions
The operating conditions for the system are considered to be reflective of
the power requirements of the New European Drive Cycle (NEDC), used to
assess the emissions of car engines and fuel economy in passenger cars. The
NEDC is representative of the typical usage of a car in Europe, consisting
of an Economic Comission for Europe (ECE)-15 urban drive cycle repeated
four times, followed by an extra-urban driving cycle. The product of which
is shown in Figure 6. It is assumed that due to the power demand from the
vehicle during this cycle, a range of failure modes can occur.
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Figure 6: New European Drive Cycle
The fuel cell is assumed to be of an open anode configuration, and there-
fore purging strategies need not be considered in the failure analysis. During
operation in the above context, the fuel cell can experience a range of op-
erating conditions that can trigger a number of failure modes. The FMEA
developed in this work details the entirety of these based upon the current
knowledge of PEMFC degradation.
3.3. New, comprehensive FMEA
The full FMEA developed contains 15 individual failure modes (Table
1) pertaining to the four main components of a PEMFC; Membrane, CL,
GDL and BIP. The failure modes listed in bold font are carried over from
the work presented by Placca & Kouta [9]. The other failure modes have
been obtained from previously published experimental results from numerous
sources, however built upon to more accurately represent up-to-date PEMFC
reliability analysis. Certain failure modes identified in [8] were omitted from
this work. Namely:
• ‘Gas leak from seals’ - This is not considered as part of this work as
seal degradation has been singled out as a negligible failure mode when
PEMFC construction is quality controlled, See [14]. Gasket seals that
do suffer from degradation are the liquid applied sealant types used in
the past. Modern systems use a solid type gasket that doesn’t suffer
the same degradation.
• ‘BIP warping of polymer matrix’ - As the boundaries for this work state
a steel BIP, a polymer BIP failure is not necessary.
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• ‘BIP cracking’ - This has been omitted as the steel plates do not suffer
from cracking, only the polymer and graphite BIPs suffer from this.
• ‘Injection-moulded BIP low electrical conductivity’ - Polymer material
BIPs are not considered in this work
• ‘Coated stainless-steel BIP loss of surface electrical conductivity’ - As
above, only plain stainless steel BIPs are considered in this work.
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Basic Events - Membrane
Flooding
Ice Formation
Incorrect BIP torque
Creep
Fatigue from Relative Humidity and Temperature cycling
Oxide Film Formation
Dissolution of Metal Ions
Contamination form Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity
OH or OOH Radical Attack
Previously Formed Pinholes
Excess Heat
Exothermal Combustion due to previously formed pinholes
Basic Events - Catalyst
Pt Loss and Distribution
Pt Migration
Dissolution of Metal Ions
Contamination form Humidifier/air pipe/gas impurity
Pt Agglomeration/Dissolution
Ice Formation
Flooding
Creep
Exothermal Combustion due to previously formed pinholes
Basic Events - Gas Diffusion Layer
OH or OOH Radical Attack
Flooding
Ice Formation
Basic Events - Bipolar plate
Oxide Film Formation
Corrosion leading to release of multivalent cations
Table 1: List of Events
The four failure modes related to the BIP are all omitted due to the
material considerations. The work in [8] considered multiple construction
materials for the BIP, however for the sake of an accurate end result pertain-
ing to a single construction type PEMFC that would be manufactured with
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only one type of BIP, this work only considers one construction type BIP
(stainless-steel).
Aside from the above omissions from previous studies, this work shares
some similarities with previous examples, however developments to logic and
basic event definitions have been made.
The full FMEA was constructed by considering each of the component
failure modes listed in Table 1 in detail. The effects that the failure mode
has local to the component and to the cell as a whole were identified. Any
methods available to detect the failure were listed. The FMEA also included
information on mitigation strategies and relationships between the failure
modes resulting in 14 pages. The full FMEA has not been included here for
brevity.
Although the majority of the failure modes in Table 1 are re-designated
and present the latest understanding of failure logic, the failure modes listed
in bold are new for this work.
One of the most important component failure mode identified by the
authors is presented in Table 2 and explained below. The importance is
derived from the effect that the failure mode has on the system, and it’s
relationship with other failure modes and operating conditions of the fuel
cell.
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Identification Function Failure Mode Local Effect System
Effect
Failure
detection
method
Mitigation
Strategy
Remarks Relationship Source
1.0 Polymer
Electrolyte
Membrane
The ’heart’
of the
PEMFC.
Forms the
electrolyte
at the cen-
tre of the
cell. Blocks
passage of
gasses and
electrons,
but facili-
tates passage
of hydrogen
protons from
anode to
cathode side
1.0/2.1 OH
and OOH
radicals &
H2O2 con-
tamination
to PTFE
End group
unzipping.
The Poly-
tetrafluo-
roethylene
(PTFE) core
material is
modified
with side
chains of
Perfluoro-
sulfonic acid
Ionomers.
These can
be lost
through OH
and OOH
radical at-
tack. (PFSI)
membrane
Weaker
membrane,
and there-
fore increase
in risk of
mechanical
damage.
Reduction
in voltage
output
Electron
Spin Res-
onance
(ESR) spec-
troscopy,
Polarisation
Curve, Lin-
ear Sweep
Voltamme-
try
Modifying
polytetraflu-
oroethylene
with in situ
sol-gel poly-
merization
of titanium
isopropoxide
to gener-
ate titania
quasinet-
works in
the polar
domains of
a polymer
electrolyte
membrane
fuel cell,
can mitigate
against the
risk of H2
and O2 gas
crossover.
Low humid-
ity and OCV
can exac-
erbate the
attack and
degradation
Protonic
resistance
of mem-
brane, H2O2
formation,
Mechanical
Damage
Wang, H, et
al. (2012)
PEM fuel
cell fail-
ure mode
analysis.
New York,
CRC Press.
(pp87)
Table 2: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis - Radical and Hydrogen Peroxide Attack
Radical and Hydrogen Peroxide attack in the membrane has a compli-
cated relationship with other components and failure modes within a PEMFC
system. The ways in which this failure mode was analysed is through results
from chemical degradation studies [5] [23] [24]. It has been discovered that
radicals can be formed from oxygen molecules permeating through from the
cathode side of the fuel cell, to the anode side of the fuel cell. This O2 can
reduce at the anode Pt catalyst, forming ·OOH radicals, and then lead on to
H2O2 formation, and more radical formation. [5] showed that Hydrogen and
Platinum can interact, forming radicals and ultimately, hydrogen peroxide.
If there are foreign ions present such as Fe+2 and Cu
+
2 released from BIP
degradation, the H2O2 formed can further develop into ·OH and ·OOH rad-
icals, and at a higher rate. Therefore the metal ions from the BIP catalyse,
and severely increased the rate of radical and peroxide degradation to the
membrane, as presented in [5].
Another mechanism for radical and peroxide attack is presented in [25].
The authors proposed a method of production of radicals, which occurs due
to the diffusion of gasses through the membrane, and formation of H2O2.
It is also suggested in [26] that peroxide can form by a 2 electron reduction
of O2 pathway.
Due to the above, OH and OOH radical attack, and H2O2 attack were
grouped into one basic events; ‘OH and OOH radicals & H2O2 contamina-
tion to PTFE’, which represents the formation under normal conditions, and
H2O2 created from 2 electron reduction of O2 on Pt.
The way in which radicals and peroxide degrade the membrane, is through
end-group unzipping, as stated in the local effect column of the FMEA entry
(Table 2). The PTFE backbone of the membrane is modified with end-groups
or side chains of perfluorosulfonic acid ionomers which help facilitate the fuel
cell reaction. These are attacked and ‘unzip’ from the PTFE core, releasing
fluorine into the exhaust water. All the entries in Table 2 are explained
below.
Column:
1. Identifies the component of the PEMFC where the given failure mode
is experienced. In this instance, ‘OH and OOH radicals & H2O2 con-
tamination to PTFE’ affects the membrane, and as such the Polymer
Electrolyte Membrane component is listed.
2. Gives a brief description of the component and its function within the
PEMFC. The Polymer Electrolyte Membrane component of a PEMFC
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is the central part of the cell which forms the electrolyte, and serves
to block the passage of reactant gasses and electrons released during
the reaction, however allows the passage of hydrogen protons from the
anode side, to cathode.
3. Contains the identification number and description of the failure mode
to affect the PEMFC. The number 1.0 is in relation to the Polymer
Electrolyte Membrane, listed in column one. The number /2.1 identifies
the second failure mode listed of that section, in it’s own sub-section.
Therefore failure modes 1.0/2.1 and 1.0/2.2 are both primarily related
to mechanical degradation.
4. Contains information pertaining to the local effect of the failure mode,
as explained earlier.
5. Lists how this local effect affects the system overall. For this example
if the membrane is weakened, there is an increased risk of mechanical
damage to the membrane and an overall reduction in the performance
of the stack/cell. This can be observed in a polarisation curve from a
linear drop in the centre section of the curve.
6. Lists the potential methods to detect this failure mode’s affect on the
system. For this example, a polarisation curve would show a drop,
as the failure mode is affecting the system. Linear sweep voltammetry
could potentially identify this failure mode as it is most commonly used
to identify gas crossover. The rate of gas crossover would change with
mechanical damage of the membrane through radical attack.
7. Lists any potential mitigation strategies to reduce the likelihood of
occurrence, or the severity of the effect. For this example, precondi-
tioning the membrane with a modified PTFE compositing to include
in-situ sol-gel polymerization of titanium isopropoxide to generate ti-
tania quasinetworks in the polar domains of the membrane. [27]
8. Contains any pertinent remarks that would either help the reader to
understand the entire row, or any factors to consider regarding the
failure mode.
9. Lists any relationships that this failure mode may have with other as-
pects of the FMEA. For this example, The resistance of the membrane
relating to proton exchange is affected through membrane thinning.
Additionally, H2O2 formation is increased through an increase in gas
crossover, and of course, mechanical degradation is facilitated.
10. Finally, the source of the data is noted for ease of referencing the ex-
perimentation that tested the failure mode. The references for this
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example are from a review book [27].
The FMEA showed that there are many failure modes in a PEMFC that
are not completely understood. The work now provides the first fully com-
prehensive FMEA using the latest information to understand more failure
modes than ever before. Relationships are considered which prove to be
invaluable in linking failure modes which is of paramount importance in
PEMFC science.
4. Proposed FT
Following investigation into the operation of the PEMFC and the FMEA
analysis carried out to understand the effect of the component failure modes
described above, a FT was constructed to consider the event ‘<5000h cell
lifetime with >5% drop of output voltage’. 15 basic events were found re-
lating to this top event, and for which data is available for a quantitative
analysis.
The structure of the FT presented by [9] was modified to more accurately
represent an up-to-date analysis of PEMFC degradation. The top event in
Figure 4 was modified to be less ambiguous, BIP degradation was added
to the ‘global tree’ (see Figure 7), and the interactions between basic event
failure logic were vastly modified. The level 2 intermediate events are also
presented in Figure 7, Catalyst Layer Degradation, Membrane Degradation,
Gas Diffusion Layer Degradation and Bipolar Plate Degradation. All in-
termediate events lead to a 5% drop in voltage corresponding with the top
event. The Bipolar plate omission by [9], has been addressed with the addi-
tion of a fourth level 2 intermediate event; ‘Bipolar Plate Degradation’. The
basic events feeding this intermediate event are; ‘Oxide film Formation’ and
‘Dissolution of metal ions’, both of which cause the plate to degrade. Cho,
et al. [28] showed that the corrosion of the metal bipolar plates for stainless
steel releases metallic elements such as Fe, Ni, Cr and Ti. The dissolution
of these metals into the Membrane Electrode Assembly (MEA) can increase
the ohmic resistance and the charge transfer resistance by taking up space
on the active sites of the catalyst. Wu, et al. [15] discuss the degradation
mechanisms of bipolar plate materials in a PEMFC, paying attention to the
formation of an oxide film on the plate. A large concern with bipolar plates,
is the contact resistance between the BIP and the GDL, attributed to the
resistance caused by the formation of the oxide film. Due to the aforemen-
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Figure 7: Proposed Change to ’Global’ Tree
tioned factors observed in [28] and [15], these two factors are included in the
presented FT as shown in Figure 7.
All of the intermediate events shown in Figure 7 are expanded out until
they only contain basic events. For example; The membrane degradation
branch of the global FT is further split down into the three main path-
ways of degradation in the membrane; ‘Mechanical Degradation’, ‘Chemical
Degradation’ and ‘Thermal Degradation’, with the mechanical section being
presented in Figure 8 for brevity.
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Figure 8: Proposed ‘Membrane’ FT Mechanical
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The intermediate events of the sub-branch shown in Figure 8 include; ‘Lo-
cal mechanical stress due to increased pressure’, ‘Microcrack Fracture’ and
‘Pinholes’. Any localised mechanical stress is caused by swelling inside the
cell, and as such the swelling relationships detailed under the event ‘Local
mechanical stress due to increased pressure’ are repeated in the ‘Microcrack
Fracture’ branch as shown by the transfer symbol. Microcrack fractures can
be considered to be anything that results in a physical breach of the mem-
brane, and is segregated from pinholes due to geometry. Microcracks can be
considered to be tears, whereas pinholes are circular holes. These are not
grouped under one mechanical breach intermediate event due to the varying
conditions and events leading to each phenomena. The Pinholes section de-
scribes the basic events and combinations of events leading to the formation
of pinholes on the membrane material. The two main pathways described are
from either mechanical stress (such as punctures from foreign bodies) and a
branch transferred in via the transfer gate (denoted by a triangle) labelled
’COMB’ in Figure 8 from the chemical degradation segment of the membrane
FT. The branches ‘Chemical Degradation’ and ‘Thermal Degradation’ of the
membrane were developed in a similar way.
4.1. Fault Tree Summary
The FT was split into branches representing the physical components of
a PEMFC; membrane, CL, GDL and BIP. These were further broken down
depending upon the categorisation of the failure phenomena. The FT was
drawn based upon information from the FMEA completely previously.
The membrane is a single component which can experience failures from
mechanical, thermal or chemical degradation mechanisms. Therefore this
section was split into the three degradation mechanisms.
The GDL has a single component construction, however there are two
GDL layers in a PEMFC and as such, this segment was split into anode side
and cathode side degradation mechanisms. Mechanical compression was also
included which would affect both sides of the GDL. The BIP is a very simple
segment with only few failure mechanisms that do not need to be further
split down into sub-categories. The CL is split into its constituent carbon
support, ionomer and Platinum particle construction materials. These three
intermediate events then branch down into the basic events and intermediate
events leading to the degradation of the component materials for the CL.
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In terms of the full tree, there are 37 indistinct intermediate events. The
majority of basic events input into OR gates as each basic event can lead
to the overall top event individually, leaving only two AND gates in the
membrane section. Similarly to the work in [9], the MCS for the overall FT
are just single basic events. Due to the complicated nature of the interactions
of basic events, and the gradual degradation of components in a PEMFC,
individual component failure modes can cause the top event in the presented
FT.
4.2. Quantification
Quantification of the FT was undertaken to gain an understanding of the
expected failure occurrence during operating life. Degradation rates were
sought from the literature where available, with any gaps in the data filled
by expert evaluation as in Table 3. For example, where available, previously
published experimental studies were analysed and the degradation rate pre-
sented due to an adverse operating condition was used in this work as the
rate associated with the same basic event occurring. For example [29] found
that when flooding occurred, a degradation in voltage equal to 0.39 Vh−1 was
observed. Therefore this rate was used to correspond to the failure mode of
”flooding”.
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Figure 9: PEMFC Membrane flooding degradation test [29]
In their experimentation, the flow rate of cathode supply feed was de-
creased to induce flooding effects in the cell, and produced the results pre-
sented in Figure 9. Two testes were conducted, and for integrity of results,
both test were considered and averaged for the overall voltage drop due to
cell flooding of 0.39 Vh−1.
Table 3 shows the basic event codes for each corresponding basic event
description. This code will be used in later tables for brevity and formatting
limitations.
As in [9], for each basic event listed in Table 3, µ(t) is assumed to follow
a Weibull distribution, where µ(t) = 1/λ(t) and λ(t) is the degradation rate.
The probability density function F (t) is given by Equation 1.
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ID Failure Mode Parameter Value (Vh−1) Ref
BE01 Flooding 0.39 [29]
BE02 Ice Formation 0.5 Proposed
BE03 Incorrect BIP torque 10−3 Proposed
BE04 Creep 10−5 Proposed
BE05 Fatigue from Relative Humidity Cy-
cling
1.2 x 10−4 [30]
BE06 Oxide film formation 3.125 x 10−5 [31]
BE07 Dissolution of metal ions 3.125 x 10−5 [31]
BE08 Contamination from Humidifier.. 4.37 x 10−3 [32]
BE09 Exothermal Combustion due to.. 1.3 x 10−2 [33]
BE10 Previously Formed Pinholes 1.3 x 10−3 [33]
BE11 OH or OOH Radical Attack 1.3 x 10−3 [33]
BE12 Excess Heat 0.25 [29]
BE13 Pt Agglomeration/Dissolution 2.5 x 10−2 [34]
BE14 Pt Loss & Distribution 2.5 x 10−2 [34]
BE15 Pt Migration 2.5 x 10−2 [34]
Table 3: List of Degradation Parameters Used
F (t) =
β
ηd
(
t− γ
ηd
)β−1
e
−
(
t−γ
ηd
)β
(1)
Where β is the shape parameter or Weibull slope, ηd is the scale param-
eter or characteristic lifetime, and γ is the location parameter. The shape
parameter is equal to the slope of the line in a probability plot.
The scale parameter can be determined from:
η =
µ(t)
Γ(1 + 1
β
)
(2)
Where:
Γ(η) =
∫ ∞
0
xη−1e−xdx (3)
The location parameter, γ, is left at 0 for this study, as it is assumed that
all degradation starts at the beginning of life for the cell.
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It was shown in [35] that if µ(t) follows a Weibull distribution with param-
eters β & ηd then times to failure (T) will also follow a Weibull distribution
with parameters β and η = Dfηd. Where Df is the degradation level at
which failure occurs. In the analysis performed here, failure is assumed to
occur when there is a 5% drop in voltage. Therefore Df = 0.05Vin where Vin
is the initial voltage of the cell. Vin is assumed to be 1 V for this work.
Using the parameters η and β for T in the fault tree, enables the proba-
bility of the top event to be determined.
Each parameter calculated for each basic event is listed in Table 4, and
shows the degradation rate, multiplicative inverse, scale parameter for µ(t),
scale parameter for T , gamma function, and the shape parameter.
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ID Deg. Rate Mu (t) Scale
Parameter
Critical
Deg. Scale
Gamma
Function
Shape
Charac-
teristic
λ(t) µ(t) ηd η Γ(α) β
BE01 0.39 2.56 2.56 0.13 1 1
BE02 0.5 2 2 0.1 1 1
BE03 10−3 100 88.26 4.41 1.13 0.8
BE04 10−5 10000 11283.79 564.19 0.89 2
BE05 1.2 x 10−4 8333.33 9403.16 470.16 0.89 2
BE06 3.125 x 10−5 32000 36108.13 1805.41 0.89 2
BE07 3.125 x 10−5 32000 36108.13 1805.41 0.89 2
BE08 4.37 x 10−3 228.83 258.21 12.91 0.89 2
BE09 1.3 x 10−2 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE10 1.3 x 10−2 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE11 1.3 x 10−2 76.92 86.80 4.34 0.89 2
BE12 0.25 4 4 0.2 1 1
BE13 2.5 x 10−2 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
BE14 2.5 x 10−2 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
BE15 2.5 x 10−2 40 35.30 1.77 1.13 0.8
Table 4: Table of Weibull distribution data used
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Figure 10: Unavailability of cell over Time
4.3. Results
The minimal cut sets for the FT developed are in fact the basic events
themselves due to the fact that the vast majority of the logic gates are of
‘OR’ gates. This means that the basic event with the highest likelihood of
failure will trigger the top event first under every iteration of the model. A
plot of the unavailability of the cell over time is shown in Figure 10.
As can be seen, the unavailability of the fuel cell - when the cell is con-
sidered failed - is after around 30 minutes hours. This is a very low lifetime
for a fuel cell, and is solely due to the highest degradation rate interacting
with the logic of the FT. BE02 - Ice Formation, has a degradation rate of
0.5V h−1 as operating a fuel cell in sub-zero temperatures has severe effects
on the materials of the fuel cell and even the blockage of feed gasses to the
reactant sites, however the probability of this occurring depends on operating
conditions.
If high degradation failure modes such as BE12, BE02 and BE01 are re-
moved, we see the unavailability increase to around 3 hours of operation (Fig-
ure 11), which is consistent with a failure due to the next highest degradation
rate. This shows that the failure mode with the lowest η and corresponding
β will be the failure mode to trigger the top event soonest.
BE01, BE02 and BE12 are failure modes that shouldn’t occur under
normal operating conditions, however they can be triggered by the occurrence
of alternative failure modes. If pinholes occur during normal operation, they
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Figure 11: Unavailability
can trigger the exothermal combustion of the feed gasses, which leads to
excess heat. The FTA approach does not consider these knock on failure
occurrences, and is an additional pitfall to using this technique for a highly
accurate degradation model.
Also, in order to understand the degradation experienced under all possi-
ble operating conditions, a FT would need to be analysed for each condition,
which can be considered to be infeasible. Alternative methods to understand
degradation in fuel cells is needed to overcome this shortfall.
5. Conclusions
This work has re-evaluated FT logic determined in the earlier work, in-
cluding the addition of previously omitted failure modes. The new FT layout
developed here is a more logical progression of the failure modes in a PEMFC
than shown previously, and as such is a step forward in the reliability analysis
of PEMFC. Up to date validity of the causes of degradation in a PEMFC
have also been shown, enhancing the understanding of reliability issues in
PEMFCs.
The presented FMEA and FTA work provides an understanding of failure
logic in a PEMFC which can be used by developers and manufacturers of
PEMFC systems, to identify key areas of improvement in the area. The
FMEA provides a detailed, systematic breakdown of each failure mode that
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a PEMFC can experience, and the failure modes’ effect on the system, and
other components. To date, this FMEA is the only comprehensive, up-to-
date listing of failure modes that a PEMFC can experience, to this level of
detail.
The presented FTA goes on from the FMEA to graphically show the logi-
cal interactions between failure mode areas. The FTA has highlighted where
each failure mode stems from, with reference to each physical component of
a PEMFC. Although the FTA presented is a step forward in the qualita-
tive reliability understanding of PEMFCs, the work has uncovered the fact
that relationships and dependencies between failure modes exist that make a
quantifiable reliability analysis not totally accurate when using FTA meth-
ods. Dependencies have been found to exist between failure modes which
would discount FTA for a quantitative analysis of a PEMFC. Specifically,
any failure due to pinholes was highlighted as an area where loops occur,
and basic events are intrinsically linked through dependent relationships. As
pinholes can be caused by the crossover of gas, which increases the rate of
gas crossover, which in turn increases pinhole production. Additionally, due
to the minimal cut sets being each individual failure mode, the failure mode
with the shortest η is the failure mode that will inevitably cause the occur-
rence of the top event first. The presented FTA considers all possible failure
modes in a fuel cell, and as such contains failure modes that are not normally
observed in ideal operating conditions. A FT would need to be developed for
each operating condition for every time-step for it to be completely accurate,
which is infeasible due to scale.
Hence, although FTA can be seen as a tool to gain a greater understanding
of how failure occurs in a PEMFC, and what basic events lead on to in a cell,
it has limited use in reliability assessment as no useful quantification can be
made. If a true understanding of the probability or frequency of failure is
required, a different approach must be adopted.
Markov modelling and Petri-Net simulation can take into account depen-
dencies between failure modes and could therefore be exploited in a PEMFC
study. However, as discussed in section 2, Markov Modelling is not suitable
for detailed component failure modelling dues to the sheer amount of states
that would be required for each of the many components in the system. As
such, future work will entail development of a Petri-Net model that can take
into account dependencies between failure modes and deal with the inherent
issues with using FTA for quantitative analysis of PEMFCs.
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